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Since the first decade of the modern mediation field, in the 1970s, self-determination has been the distinguishing feature of
mediation.1 Whereas in arbitration or adjudication the third party is the decision
maker, mediators assist the parties but have
no decision-making power.2 In mediator
codes of conduct, party self-determination
has been enshrined as a guiding principle
from very early on.3 Although the meaning of the term seems self-evident, over
the years it has been interpreted differently
by mediators using different models of mediation. Each model has its own principles
and methods, and each one appeals to different mediators and clienteles4. This diversity of approaches has generated
healthy debate and provided potential clients with a choice of mediation models,
and the extent to which self-determination
has been applied differs widely from model
to model.
For example, an evaluative mediator might
hold that advising and guiding the parties
toward outcomes that respect given norms
is within the realm of self-determination,
where a transformative mediator might
consider such guidance as interference. Is
it necessary that all mediators work the
same way? Most of us would answer,
“No.” A more appropriate question is,
“Should codes of conduct oblige mediators to clearly discuss with the parties the process to be used in mediation and obtain their agreement
thereon?” We believe they should, and
many codes require just that. 5 By
clearly describing their methods beforehand with each party, mediators
provide prospective parties with the
opportunity to determine for themselves if this model of mediation is likely
to suit their situation. This discussion
would then be reviewed in the presence of
all parties before the mediation contract
is signed. There are several models
available and the public should be

made aware of the possibility of choosing the model they consider appropriate.
Over the years mediation has continuously
evolved and mediation theorists have introduced many new approaches, such as
interest-based practice and accountability
for substantive fairness, with power-balancing as a means of achieving it. In the
1990s transformative6 or party-driven 7
mediation was introduced. These various
approaches have not been universally accepted by mediators; while some codes of
conduct authorize a wide range of practice, other codes favor one approach to the
exclusion of others.
Mediator codes of conduct are currently
being written or revised that will have a
profound influence on how mediation is
practiced in years to come. Moreover, in
Quebec, the government is in the process
of amending the Civil Code of Procedure
to include the practice of mediation in a
formal framework of detailed prescriptions
potentially limiting choice of approach8.
Some mediator codes of conduct restrict
methods of practice by obliging mediators
to practice a certain model of mediation9;
others override party decision-making and
terminate mediation if parties do not respect certain rules.10 We maintain that these
restrictions are unnecessary and counterproductive. In our opinion, mediator codes
of conduct and other forms of mediation
regulation should be drafted in ways that
allow different models of mediation to be
practiced and new methods to develop in
the future.
A brief overview of these approaches follows.

Interest-based mediation
In the early 1980s, the mediation field was
strongly influenced by the publication of
Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In11, where authors Fisher
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and Ury introduced the notion that by exploring and focusing on parties’ underlying interests, problems could be clearly
defined and solved in ways that would produce creative, mutually acceptable outcomes.
Although not universally adopted, interestbased mediation became widely used and
the method became known as facilitative
mediation.12 This entailed mediators leading parties through a series of specific negotiation steps or stages to facilitate settlement via collaborative rather than
adversarial bargaining. By applying such
strategies as “Separate the People from the
Problem,” “Focus on Interests, Not Positions,” and “Use Objective Criteria,” mediators began taking on a more directive
role, and as a result, some of the responsibility for solving problems shifted to the
mediator’s shoulders. Many saw this as
effective mediating while others saw it as
diminishing party self-determination.

Mediator accountability
for substantive fairness
A parallel development introduced in the
early 1980s was the quest for substantive
fairness. In the 1970s practitioners made
no particular claim that mediated agreements were substantively fair by some
objective standard. The mediator’s duty of
impartiality applied to the conduct of the
process itself, but the only guarantee regarding outcome was that any agreement
would be “mutually acceptable” to the parties.13 In 1981 mediation theorist Lawrence
Susskind argued that mediators could not
ignore the potential for parties to make
unwise decisions and therefore agree to
unfair deals, and he suggested that the
mediator was accountable to intervene in
ways that reduced that risk of unfairness.14
Another mediation theorist, Joseph B.
Stulberg, countered that substantive intervention to ensure a fair agreement would
contradict the mediator’s duty of impartiality, and even worse, compromise his or
her ability to serve the central function of
facilitating a mutually acceptable agreement between the parties.15
This debate has continued, but over time a
majority of mediators have taken the position that substantive fairness of outcome

is indeed one of the mediator’s key responsibilities. Even though there is no significant body of research that documents the
substantive fairness of mediated agreements, particularly in cases involving parties of unequal power,16 some competency
tests now ask whether the mediator helped
to develop an “agreement that is balanced,
fair, realistic.”17 This responsibility for creating outcomes that the mediator thinks are
acceptable, fair or workable is often taken
seriously by mediators and directly affects
their approach to intervention in disputes
across the sectors of practice.

Examining the strategy
of power-balancing
To ensure fairness, some mediation theorists proposed that mediators engage in the
practice of power-balancing when they
intervene in disputes. Christopher Moore,
author of one of the basic and widely used
texts on mediation practice, advocates
“assisting the weaker party in obtaining,
organizing and analyzing data, . . . educating the party in planning an effective negotiation strategy, aiding the party in developing . . . resources [to continue to
negotiate, and] encouraging the party to
make realistic concessions. . . .18”
John Haynes, another widely recognized
authority and a founder of divorce mediation, claims that power-balancing is effective in preventing unjust outcomes. He states,
“When the power balance interferes
with the couple’s ability to negotiate a
fair agreement, I believe the mediator has
a responsibility to correct that imbalance.19”
“[T]he mediator intervenes to take
charge of the way the couple communicate and reorganizes it to disempower
the overly powerful spouse and empower the powerless spouse.20” (emphasis added)
Other voices pointed out that the existence
of differing cultural norms might constitute an obstacle to ensuring fairness. Thus,
the emphasis placed on sequential turn-taking, on encouraging rational discussion of
problems and solutions, and on discouraging strong and extended emotional “outbursts”—can inadvertently work to the
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disadvantage of groups in society unaccustomed, unskilled, or uncomfortable with
communicating in this manner.21
Another obstacle stands in the way of ensuring fairness. The very nature of mediation as an informal process means that
mediators can never count on the completeness or accuracy of the information
presented by parties in the session. Nor is
there any way for mediators to require
more information or to authenticate what
is offered.22 If the mediator facilitates a
settlement based on partial information, the
resulting outcome is likely to lack substantive fairness.
Perhaps more important to the credibility
of the mediation, as Stulberg argues persuasively, the power-balancing mediator
becomes an advocate for one party and
loses the trust of the other party. Once that
trust is lost, the mediator cannot work effectively because one of the parties no
longer is confident of the mediator’s impartiality or neutral motives.23 Nonetheless,
some codes of ethics recommend24 or prescribe25 that mediators accept the responsibility to balance power and alter the dynamics of parties’ relationships. The
commitment to balancing power often
overrides a commitment to party-determined choices and party-created outcomes.

Transformative or
Party-driven Mediation
In 1994, the authors of The Promise of
Mediation, Responding to Conflict
Through Empowerment and Recognition26
proposed a renewed emphasis on party
empowerment in mediation, allowing parties to address disputes in their own way,
and leaving it up to them to be the ultimate judge of what constitutes both an
acceptable process and a fair outcome.
Called transformative or party-driven27
mediation, this approach defines party selfdetermination very broadly, placing decision making control entirely in the hands
of the parties and not the mediator. This
applies not only to the content and outcome
of discussions but to the parties’ manner
of interaction28. Parties determine what
they need to have in place during a mediation session to be able to have the most

productive conflict interaction possible.
When there is disagreement about this the
parties are supported in having a conversation about this and determining whether
and how the process can continue.
Transformative mediators do not use
power-balancing and believe they should
not be obliged by codes of conduct to do
so. In describing mediation to a prospective party beforehand, the transformative
mediator explains that if the discussion
between the parties appears to be unbalanced, the mediator does not intervene to
balance the power. What the mediator does
instead is to fully support each party, both
in presenting their views as fully and powerfully as they choose to, and in using
whatever manner of expression they
choose—rational, emotional, or both.29
Transformative practitioners believe that
parties themselves hold the ultimate defense against injustice—the ability to leave
when they choose to do so—and that right
is fully supported by the mediator.30
Critics have claimed that by taking a nondirective position towards the parties,
transformative mediators risk allowing the
stronger party to dominate. Transformative
mediators respond that each party holds an
ultimate veto over how the conversation
will take place, and if, at any point, one
party believes that the other is no longer
acting reasonably, he or she can call a halt,
request a separate meeting, end the session,
or terminate the mediation.31
Parties are viewed as the best judges of
what justice is.32 Thus party-driven, transformative mediation practice, based on and
shaped by the fundamental principle of
genuinely supporting party choice, acts as
a brake against unfair outcomes in individual cases, even when the parties are of
unequal power.33 By systematically deferring to party decision-making over every
aspect of both process and substance as the
mediation unfolds, the transformative mediator helps parties regain confidence in
their ability to clarify and express their
views, and take perspective. In this more
constructive context, it will be easier for
parties to assess for themselves the
fairness or unfairness of mediation pro-

cess and outcomes.
Given this brief description of transformative mediation’s foundational respect for
the principle of party self-determination,
it is important that codes of mediator conduct not exclude this approach, or any
other approach that places party-self-determination at the heart of the mediation
process. Instead, it is important that codes
of conduct require mediators to fully explain their role within the context of the
mediation model they propose so that parties will know what to expect in the mediation session.

Codes of Conduct and
Diverse Mediation Practice
Some codes attempt to make space for a
wide range of practice, including partydriven approaches while others, narrowly
constructed, mandate more strictly mediator-driven modes of practice. Two Canadian examples will serve to illustrate this point.
The ADR Institute of Canada Code of
Conduct for Mediators34 governs mediators among the 1800 members of the Institute. It allows mediators to support party
self-determination without proviso. Its
stated objective is to apply “guiding principles for the conduct of mediators… [and]
“protection for members of the public who
use mediators…”
Without using the term “self-determination,” the code clearly states, “It is the right
of parties to a Mediation to make their own
voluntary and non-coerced decisions regarding the possible resolution of any issue in dispute. Every Mediator shall respect and encourage this fundamental
principle of Mediation.” It also states, “The
Mediator shall provide the parties at or
before the first Mediation session with information about the Mediator’s role in the
Mediation. The Mediator shall discuss the
fact that authority for decision-making
rests with the parties, not the Mediator.”
Reinforcing this idea, it states, “The Mediator shall make reasonable efforts before
Mediation is initiated or at the start of the
Mediation to ensure that the parties understand the Mediation process.” Once the
parties have been made aware of the process the mediator intends to use, they “shall

prepare and execute a Mediation agreement setting out. . . the terms under which
the parties are engaging the Mediator.”
We consider this to be a helpful approach.
Having made it clear that parties are in
charge, the code need not arm the mediator as the final arbiter of the parties’ conduct. Instead, it gives the mediator and the
parties each a potential veto by stating,
“The Mediator may suspend or terminate
the Mediation if requested, in writing, by
one or more of the parties,” and “The Mediator may suspend or terminate the Mediation with a written declaration by the
Mediator that further efforts at mediation
would not be useful at this time.” This
should be read in conjunction with the indication that, “A Mediator who considers
that a Mediation in which he or she is involved may raise ethical concerns (including, without limitation, the furtherance of
a crime or a deliberate deception) may take
appropriate action, which may include adjourning or terminating the process.” (emphasis added). In all these respects, the
ADR Canada Code of Conduct for Mediators can be said to be inclusive of both
mediator-driven and party-driven models
of mediation.
This code of conduct stands in direct contrast to the Ontario Bar Association’s
(CBAO) Model Code of Conduct35 which
contains restrictions having the effect of
overriding party self-determination. It governs Ontario mediators working under the
Mandatory Mediation Program (MMP) in
place in Ottawa, Toronto and Windsor.
The CBAO code begins with a section
mandating mediator respect for party selfdetermination, but it is followed by another
section mandating considerable mediator
decision-making power over questions of
both process and potential outcome.
It states: “Self-determination is the right
of parties in a mediation to make their own
voluntary and non-coerced decisions regarding the possible resolution of any issue in dispute. It is a fundamental principle
of mediation which mediators shall respect
and encourage.”
The above statement appears to allow par-
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ties “to make their own voluntary and noncoerced decisions”, but in the section entitled XI. Termination or Suspension of
Mediation, the code orders that mediators
shall terminate a mediation if any one of
the following situations is perceived to
exist in the opinion of the mediator and it
has not been not rectified by the parties:
(a) the process is likely to prejudice one
or more of the parties;
(b) one or more of the parties is using
the process inappropriately;
(c) one or more of the parties is delaying the process to the detriment of
another party or parties;
(d) the mediation process is detrimental to one or more of the parties or
the mediator;
(e) it appears that a party is not acting
in good faith;
(f) there are other reasons that are or
appear to be counterproductive to
the process.
(emphasis added)
The loosely definable terms reproduced in
italics mandate mediators to 1) form an
opinion about what they perceive to be
happening in the room (or which might
perceivably happen in the future), 2) point
out the offending situation to the party or
parties, 3) require parties to rectify the situation, and 4) terminate mediation if they
consider that the parties have not complied
with their instructions. In these key respects, the CBAO code can be said to mandate a mediator-driven model of mediation
and thereby exclude approaches to practice which prioritize party self-determina-

tion of parties at all points in the mediation.
How might a transformative mediator respond in situations such as these? Rather
than requiring a party or parties to rectify
conduct that appears to fall under these
categories, a transformative mediator
would continue with his or her central task
of helping each party regain a sense of
competency and perspective. This means
systematically supporting party expression
and choices, deferring to the parties’ own
judgment36. The parties themselves determine whether they believe the other is using the process inappropriately, whether
the process is detrimental to them, whether
the other is acting in good faith or whether
they believe that the mediation process is
counterproductive.

Conclusion
In the information age, approaches in all
fields are constantly evolving and new
approaches are continuously being made
available to the public on a wide scale.
Thus, facilitative mediation is no longer
what it was in the 1980’s. Transformative
mediation has evolved considerably beyond its initial description in 1994. Other
mediation approaches have been introduced since then and this trend will continue and probably accelerate. In our opinion, mediators will be at their most
effective when they are able to adopt the
type of mediation that corresponds best to
their view of conflict and human nature37.
In order to protect the public’s right to
choose the type of mediation which they
consider appropriate to help them deal with
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